Critical Checks
Critical checks run every 10 minutes. Typical wall-clock cost on a busy shared host is a few seconds; the runner enforces the 10-minute cadence even when a tick takes longer.
The tables below name the finding identifiers CSM emits, grouped by area. Most are standalone scheduled checks; a few (for example the http_* traffic findings and bad_asn_outbound) are produced by a parent scheduled check – the access-log brute-force scan and the periodic connection scan respectively – rather than being independently scheduled.
Process & System
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
fake_kernel_threads | Non-root processes masquerading as kernel threads (rootkit indicator) |
suspicious_processes | Reverse shells, interactive shells, GSocket, suspicious executables |
detached_web_process | A non-root process running for at least five minutes that holds a PHP handler listener (LiteSpeed LSAPI or PHP-FPM) with no PHP or web server runtime in its ancestry: a web request started it and it outlived the request. A shell is Critical, the loop shape a webshell leaves behind; with kill_processes on it is stopped with its shell parents of the same account under the rules for loops that write back a removed file, unless a terminal or an SSH, cron or cPanel session is in its ancestry. BusyBox is treated as a shell only when running a shell applet. Anything else, such as a site’s PHP worker or an image job, is a Warning for review and is never stopped on this evidence. Processes with incomplete ancestry, and listeners in other network namespaces, are not classified |
docroot_binary_exec | A non-root program running from a document root. The live exec monitor judges each start; this check judges programs still running. Critical (or the rule’s severity) when the program matches a YARA rule, whoever started it; Warning when a PHP interpreter started it and no rule matched. CGI programs run by the web server, build tools such as esbuild and other launchers stay quiet unless a rule matches. Program verdicts are cached by file identity and change time, scan-size limit, and detection version. Rule reloads and worker restarts invalidate cached verdicts. Oversized images and scripts receive only a header read. Scripts are not programs here: their interpreter lives outside the document root. Exited processes are inspected only through canonical absolute paths without symlinks; missing processes and files are quiet. Starts that arrive faster than the live monitor can inspect them are counted in the bpf.execution.docroot queue health row |
php_processes | PHP process execution, working dirs, environment variables |
shadow_changes | /etc/shadow modification outside maintenance windows |
uid0_accounts | Unauthorized root (UID 0) accounts |
kernel_modules | Kernel module loading (post-baseline). High. af_alg and algif_hash, which upgrades load on demand, are a Warning when a package was installed or updated since the previous scan; every other module, algif_aead (Copy Fail) included, stays High |
af_alg_socket_use | AF_ALG socket use that may indicate Copy Fail exploit activity |
af_alg_enforcement | AF_ALG hardening policy drift and correction status |
SSH & Access
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
ssh_keys | Unauthorized entries in /root/.ssh/authorized_keys |
sshd_config | SSH hardening (PermitRootLogin, PasswordAuthentication, etc.) |
ssh_logins | SSH access anomalies with geolocation |
api_tokens | cPanel/WHM API token usage |
whm_access | WHM/root login patterns, multi-IP access |
cpanel_logins | cPanel login anomalies, multi-IP correlation |
cpanel_filemanager | File Manager usage for unauthorized access |
Network
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
outbound_connections | Root-level outbound to non-infra IPs (C2, backdoor ports) |
user_outbound | Per-user outbound connections (non-standard ports). System accounts for Knot DNS (TCP 853) and chrony or ntpsec (NTS key exchange, TCP 4460) are exempt on that port only; hosting accounts with those names are still reported |
bad_asn_outbound | Outbound connection whose destination resolves (via GeoLite2-ASN) to a bad or unexpected autonomous system. Config detection.bad_asn_outbound: blocked_asns (always bad) and/or allowed_asns (allowlist mode – anything outside is bad). Classified for every process including root (the periodic connection scan); non-root connections are also flagged in real time by the live BPF tracker. Off by default; the third leg of the host_takeover incident chain |
dns_connections | DNS exfiltration and suspicious queries |
firewall | Firewall status and rule integrity |
Brute Force & Auth
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
wp_bruteforce | WordPress login brute force (wp-login.php, xmlrpc.php) |
http_scanner_profile | Source IPs whose traffic is mostly probe-error responses across many distinct paths in one scheduled scan window |
http_claimed_bot_unverified | High-volume claimed crawler traffic while reverse-DNS verification is still pending; challenge-routed when the challenge subsystem is enabled |
http_ua_spoof | IP hitting the per-IP spoof threshold with a search-engine bot UA that fails reverse-DNS verification, or with scripting/headless/empty UAs when those opt-in flags are enabled |
http_distributed_flood | Many already-abusive HTTP source IPs hitting the same vhost in one scheduled scan window |
http_asn_crawl | A single ASN distributing expensive, uncacheable requests across many addresses while one account’s PHP worker pool is saturated. Request classification is a heuristic, not proof of backend cost. Reverse-proxy ASNs and operator allowlists are excluded; Critical findings can carry the specific source CIDRs eligible for temporary blocking. |
webshell_caller | A client that requested a PHP file CSM flagged as a webshell, one finding per client and account, with request and POST counts, the files and a sample request. Requests keep counting after CSM removes the file. Known site entry points, files the installed WordPress or plugin release ships, and a document root’s own index are excluded from caller attribution. A request alone does not prove the client operated the shell; a compromised page can direct visitors there. cPanel hosts only. It reads the recent tail of each site log, so a single request on a busy site can be missed, and a file detected only in real time counts once a scheduled scan reports it. Alert only: no automatic response |
webshell_path_public | A flagged PHP file requested by many distinct clients across all domains serving it. Infrastructure addresses and verified bots count toward this summary but never receive individual caller findings. Its clients are not reported one by one as webshell_caller |
ftp_logins | FTP access patterns and failed auth |
webmail_logins | Roundcube/Horde access anomalies |
api_auth_failures | API authentication failure patterns |
Webshell caller attribution uses dated requests from the last 24 hours and preserves the full request target before resolving dot segments and PHP path info. Above-root traversal is rejected. URL paths are decoded once, including encoded slashes, before resolving dot segments. For a directory request, a trailing decoded slash permits an index.php lookup. Double-encoded slashes are not decoded again. Attribution counts probes, including 404 responses, and does not prove that PHP ran. This assumes decoded path separators; server settings that preserve them, such as Apache’s NoDecode policy, URL rewrites and custom directory indexes are not inferred. When a client accesses the same file through several domains, its account finding does not name a single domain. These exclusions affect caller attribution only; file scanning is unchanged.
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
mail_queue | Mail queue buildup (spam outbreak indicator). Exim aborts when it cannot write its own log, and the daemon’s sandbox makes /var/log read-only, so the queue query runs as a transient unit forked by PID 1. Hosts without systemd-run query exim directly. |
mail_queue_unavailable | The queue depth could not be read, so buildup detection is inactive. Reported instead of assuming the queue is empty. |
mail_per_account | Per-account email volume spikes |
All Exim queue reads and actions started by the daemon run as transient services outside its read-only filesystem sandbox. This includes queue composition, safe backscatter flushing, and PHP relay freeze or thaw actions. If systemd-run is unavailable, CSM runs them directly; a host without Exim skips the Exim-only queue check. The target command is attempted at most once, and cancellation during the wrapper probe stops it before execution.
Data & Integrity
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
crontabs | Suspicious cron jobs and scheduled commands |
mysql_users | MySQL user accounts and privileges |
database_dumps | Database exfiltration attempts |
exfiltration_paste | Connections to pastebin/code-sharing sites |
The MySQL audit exempts mysql@localhost only when MariaDB confirms its stock
socket authentication setup with password authentication disabled. Modified
authentication, other host literals, and accounts whose setup cannot be verified
remain reportable.
Threat Intelligence
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
ip_reputation | IPs against external threat databases and optional rspamd history. Passive HTTP/cPanel sightings are High; SSH and mail-auth activity is Critical |
modsec_audit | ModSecurity audit log parsing |
The attack database counts a finding only against the source address the
finding carries as a structured field. Addresses that appear only in message
text, such as a connection’s destination, a process name or a file path, never
build a score. Scores that earlier releases built from such text are corrected
automatically when the daemon starts; blocks they already caused are not lifted.
The correction has no setting; auto_response.block_ips controls new automatic
blocks.
Raw mail and SMTP login failures are not counted. The mail and SMTP brute-force detectors decide those blocks, and they account for successful logins and mail authentication backend outages, so a mistyped password or a backend outage never raises an address’s local threat score.
At the upgrade restart, stored attack records are re-scored and retired scoring state is removed on the next successful save, including records whose score is unchanged. Existing counts and event history are retained, and existing blocks stay until expiry or operator removal. Rolling back before that save can restore the retired scoring state; an older daemon also resumes scoring new raw mail failures.
The local threat score ranks addresses on the threat page and feeds the unified
verdict. No scheduled check turns it into findings or blocks; the checks that
provide attack evidence apply their own response policies.
No check produces local_threat_score findings any more: the database
malware response reports the addresses of live WordPress sessions in its
notice instead of blocking them, since the site owner’s sessions are among
them. Findings older versions stored under that name clear after the next
completed critical scan. A legacy disabled_checks: [local_threat_score]
value is still accepted but does not disable ip_reputation or its health
checks. Queued score findings and block retries under that name are discarded;
existing blocks stay until expiry or operator removal.
auto_response.block_ips controls new automatic blocks; there is no setting for
the startup correction.
The local threat score retains evidence attributed to the server itself. Such records can represent forwarded attacks or a compromised local process; firewall protection against blocking the server does not establish that traffic is safe.
Performance
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
perf_load | CPU load average thresholds |
perf_php_processes | PHP process count and memory |
perf_memory | Swap usage and OOM killer activity |
Health
| Check | Description |
|---|---|
health | Daemon health, binary integrity, required services |
Platform Support
Runs on every supported platform unless noted below. The daemon auto-detects OS and panel at startup and silently skips cPanel-specific checks on plain Linux hosts (no “not found” spam).
cPanel-only (skipped on plain Ubuntu/AlmaLinux):
api_tokens,whm_access,cpanel_logins,cpanel_filemanager– read WHM API and cPanel session logswp_bruteforce– iterates/home/*/public_html/*/wp-login.phpand per-domain access logs. The domlog pass ranks recent logs first and honorsthresholds.domlog_max_files,thresholds.domlog_tail_lines, andthresholds.domlog_max_age_min.webmail_logins– parses cPanel Roundcube/Horde logsmail_per_account– reads/var/log/exim_mainlog
Plain Linux equivalents that still provide coverage:
mail_queueruns on any host where Exim is installed and is skipped when there is no Exim queue.- Access log brute-force detection (
wp_login_bruteforce,xmlrpc_abuse) runs against the detected web server’s access log (/var/log/nginx/access.logor/var/log/httpd/access_log), so WordPress brute-force alerts still fire on non-cPanel hosts – they just rely on the live log watcher rather than per-domain domlog scanning. modsec_auditruns on any host with ModSecurity installed.ssh_logins, SSH brute force, PAM listener, firewall, kernel modules, RPM/DEB integrity, and threat intelligence all run on every supported platform.