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Critical Checks

Critical checks run every 10 minutes. Typical wall-clock cost on a busy shared host is a few seconds; the runner enforces the 10-minute cadence even when a tick takes longer.

The tables below name the finding identifiers CSM emits, grouped by area. Most are standalone scheduled checks; a few (for example the http_* traffic findings and bad_asn_outbound) are produced by a parent scheduled check – the access-log brute-force scan and the periodic connection scan respectively – rather than being independently scheduled.

Process & System

CheckDescription
fake_kernel_threadsNon-root processes masquerading as kernel threads (rootkit indicator)
suspicious_processesReverse shells, interactive shells, GSocket, suspicious executables
detached_web_processA non-root process running for at least five minutes that holds a PHP handler listener (LiteSpeed LSAPI or PHP-FPM) with no PHP or web server runtime in its ancestry: a web request started it and it outlived the request. A shell is Critical, the loop shape a webshell leaves behind; with kill_processes on it is stopped with its shell parents of the same account under the rules for loops that write back a removed file, unless a terminal or an SSH, cron or cPanel session is in its ancestry. BusyBox is treated as a shell only when running a shell applet. Anything else, such as a site’s PHP worker or an image job, is a Warning for review and is never stopped on this evidence. Processes with incomplete ancestry, and listeners in other network namespaces, are not classified
docroot_binary_execA non-root program running from a document root. The live exec monitor judges each start; this check judges programs still running. Critical (or the rule’s severity) when the program matches a YARA rule, whoever started it; Warning when a PHP interpreter started it and no rule matched. CGI programs run by the web server, build tools such as esbuild and other launchers stay quiet unless a rule matches. Program verdicts are cached by file identity and change time, scan-size limit, and detection version. Rule reloads and worker restarts invalidate cached verdicts. Oversized images and scripts receive only a header read. Scripts are not programs here: their interpreter lives outside the document root. Exited processes are inspected only through canonical absolute paths without symlinks; missing processes and files are quiet. Starts that arrive faster than the live monitor can inspect them are counted in the bpf.execution.docroot queue health row
php_processesPHP process execution, working dirs, environment variables
shadow_changes/etc/shadow modification outside maintenance windows
uid0_accountsUnauthorized root (UID 0) accounts
kernel_modulesKernel module loading (post-baseline). High. af_alg and algif_hash, which upgrades load on demand, are a Warning when a package was installed or updated since the previous scan; every other module, algif_aead (Copy Fail) included, stays High
af_alg_socket_useAF_ALG socket use that may indicate Copy Fail exploit activity
af_alg_enforcementAF_ALG hardening policy drift and correction status

SSH & Access

CheckDescription
ssh_keysUnauthorized entries in /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
sshd_configSSH hardening (PermitRootLogin, PasswordAuthentication, etc.)
ssh_loginsSSH access anomalies with geolocation
api_tokenscPanel/WHM API token usage
whm_accessWHM/root login patterns, multi-IP access
cpanel_loginscPanel login anomalies, multi-IP correlation
cpanel_filemanagerFile Manager usage for unauthorized access

Network

CheckDescription
outbound_connectionsRoot-level outbound to non-infra IPs (C2, backdoor ports)
user_outboundPer-user outbound connections (non-standard ports). System accounts for Knot DNS (TCP 853) and chrony or ntpsec (NTS key exchange, TCP 4460) are exempt on that port only; hosting accounts with those names are still reported
bad_asn_outboundOutbound connection whose destination resolves (via GeoLite2-ASN) to a bad or unexpected autonomous system. Config detection.bad_asn_outbound: blocked_asns (always bad) and/or allowed_asns (allowlist mode – anything outside is bad). Classified for every process including root (the periodic connection scan); non-root connections are also flagged in real time by the live BPF tracker. Off by default; the third leg of the host_takeover incident chain
dns_connectionsDNS exfiltration and suspicious queries
firewallFirewall status and rule integrity

Brute Force & Auth

CheckDescription
wp_bruteforceWordPress login brute force (wp-login.php, xmlrpc.php)
http_scanner_profileSource IPs whose traffic is mostly probe-error responses across many distinct paths in one scheduled scan window
http_claimed_bot_unverifiedHigh-volume claimed crawler traffic while reverse-DNS verification is still pending; challenge-routed when the challenge subsystem is enabled
http_ua_spoofIP hitting the per-IP spoof threshold with a search-engine bot UA that fails reverse-DNS verification, or with scripting/headless/empty UAs when those opt-in flags are enabled
http_distributed_floodMany already-abusive HTTP source IPs hitting the same vhost in one scheduled scan window
http_asn_crawlA single ASN distributing expensive, uncacheable requests across many addresses while one account’s PHP worker pool is saturated. Request classification is a heuristic, not proof of backend cost. Reverse-proxy ASNs and operator allowlists are excluded; Critical findings can carry the specific source CIDRs eligible for temporary blocking.
webshell_callerA client that requested a PHP file CSM flagged as a webshell, one finding per client and account, with request and POST counts, the files and a sample request. Requests keep counting after CSM removes the file. Known site entry points, files the installed WordPress or plugin release ships, and a document root’s own index are excluded from caller attribution. A request alone does not prove the client operated the shell; a compromised page can direct visitors there. cPanel hosts only. It reads the recent tail of each site log, so a single request on a busy site can be missed, and a file detected only in real time counts once a scheduled scan reports it. Alert only: no automatic response
webshell_path_publicA flagged PHP file requested by many distinct clients across all domains serving it. Infrastructure addresses and verified bots count toward this summary but never receive individual caller findings. Its clients are not reported one by one as webshell_caller
ftp_loginsFTP access patterns and failed auth
webmail_loginsRoundcube/Horde access anomalies
api_auth_failuresAPI authentication failure patterns

Webshell caller attribution uses dated requests from the last 24 hours and preserves the full request target before resolving dot segments and PHP path info. Above-root traversal is rejected. URL paths are decoded once, including encoded slashes, before resolving dot segments. For a directory request, a trailing decoded slash permits an index.php lookup. Double-encoded slashes are not decoded again. Attribution counts probes, including 404 responses, and does not prove that PHP ran. This assumes decoded path separators; server settings that preserve them, such as Apache’s NoDecode policy, URL rewrites and custom directory indexes are not inferred. When a client accesses the same file through several domains, its account finding does not name a single domain. These exclusions affect caller attribution only; file scanning is unchanged.

Email

CheckDescription
mail_queueMail queue buildup (spam outbreak indicator). Exim aborts when it cannot write its own log, and the daemon’s sandbox makes /var/log read-only, so the queue query runs as a transient unit forked by PID 1. Hosts without systemd-run query exim directly.
mail_queue_unavailableThe queue depth could not be read, so buildup detection is inactive. Reported instead of assuming the queue is empty.
mail_per_accountPer-account email volume spikes

All Exim queue reads and actions started by the daemon run as transient services outside its read-only filesystem sandbox. This includes queue composition, safe backscatter flushing, and PHP relay freeze or thaw actions. If systemd-run is unavailable, CSM runs them directly; a host without Exim skips the Exim-only queue check. The target command is attempted at most once, and cancellation during the wrapper probe stops it before execution.

Data & Integrity

CheckDescription
crontabsSuspicious cron jobs and scheduled commands
mysql_usersMySQL user accounts and privileges
database_dumpsDatabase exfiltration attempts
exfiltration_pasteConnections to pastebin/code-sharing sites

The MySQL audit exempts mysql@localhost only when MariaDB confirms its stock socket authentication setup with password authentication disabled. Modified authentication, other host literals, and accounts whose setup cannot be verified remain reportable.

Threat Intelligence

CheckDescription
ip_reputationIPs against external threat databases and optional rspamd history. Passive HTTP/cPanel sightings are High; SSH and mail-auth activity is Critical
modsec_auditModSecurity audit log parsing

The attack database counts a finding only against the source address the finding carries as a structured field. Addresses that appear only in message text, such as a connection’s destination, a process name or a file path, never build a score. Scores that earlier releases built from such text are corrected automatically when the daemon starts; blocks they already caused are not lifted. The correction has no setting; auto_response.block_ips controls new automatic blocks.

Raw mail and SMTP login failures are not counted. The mail and SMTP brute-force detectors decide those blocks, and they account for successful logins and mail authentication backend outages, so a mistyped password or a backend outage never raises an address’s local threat score.

At the upgrade restart, stored attack records are re-scored and retired scoring state is removed on the next successful save, including records whose score is unchanged. Existing counts and event history are retained, and existing blocks stay until expiry or operator removal. Rolling back before that save can restore the retired scoring state; an older daemon also resumes scoring new raw mail failures.

The local threat score ranks addresses on the threat page and feeds the unified verdict. No scheduled check turns it into findings or blocks; the checks that provide attack evidence apply their own response policies. No check produces local_threat_score findings any more: the database malware response reports the addresses of live WordPress sessions in its notice instead of blocking them, since the site owner’s sessions are among them. Findings older versions stored under that name clear after the next completed critical scan. A legacy disabled_checks: [local_threat_score] value is still accepted but does not disable ip_reputation or its health checks. Queued score findings and block retries under that name are discarded; existing blocks stay until expiry or operator removal. auto_response.block_ips controls new automatic blocks; there is no setting for the startup correction.

The local threat score retains evidence attributed to the server itself. Such records can represent forwarded attacks or a compromised local process; firewall protection against blocking the server does not establish that traffic is safe.

Performance

CheckDescription
perf_loadCPU load average thresholds
perf_php_processesPHP process count and memory
perf_memorySwap usage and OOM killer activity

Health

CheckDescription
healthDaemon health, binary integrity, required services

Platform Support

Runs on every supported platform unless noted below. The daemon auto-detects OS and panel at startup and silently skips cPanel-specific checks on plain Linux hosts (no “not found” spam).

cPanel-only (skipped on plain Ubuntu/AlmaLinux):

  • api_tokens, whm_access, cpanel_logins, cpanel_filemanager – read WHM API and cPanel session logs
  • wp_bruteforce – iterates /home/*/public_html/*/wp-login.php and per-domain access logs. The domlog pass ranks recent logs first and honors thresholds.domlog_max_files, thresholds.domlog_tail_lines, and thresholds.domlog_max_age_min.
  • webmail_logins – parses cPanel Roundcube/Horde logs
  • mail_per_account – reads /var/log/exim_mainlog

Plain Linux equivalents that still provide coverage:

  • mail_queue runs on any host where Exim is installed and is skipped when there is no Exim queue.
  • Access log brute-force detection (wp_login_bruteforce, xmlrpc_abuse) runs against the detected web server’s access log (/var/log/nginx/access.log or /var/log/httpd/access_log), so WordPress brute-force alerts still fire on non-cPanel hosts – they just rely on the live log watcher rather than per-domain domlog scanning.
  • modsec_audit runs on any host with ModSecurity installed.
  • ssh_logins, SSH brute force, PAM listener, firewall, kernel modules, RPM/DEB integrity, and threat intelligence all run on every supported platform.